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ten; and the author's conclusions square pretty well with those drawn by Fechner (*Elem.*, I, 199) and Müller (*Grdl.*, 225).

Dr. Wreschner may be heartily congratulated on the accomplishment of so thorough and comprehensive a piece of work. The criticisms passed above must be taken as suggestions only; the true test of an experimental enquiry lies in its fruitfulness for further research, and its stability in face of new results.

E. B. TITCHENER.

Etudes d'Histoire de la Philosophie, par E. BOUTROUX. Alcan, 1897.

The first chapter of Mr. Boutroux's "*Etudes*" treats of the conception of History of Philosophy. He does not think that the philosopher as a man ought to be dealt with; nor does he consider the study of special treatises on some topic or other, the object of History of Philosophy. Only in case we find in the writings of a thinker the elements necessary to truly constitute a system of philosophy, need we consider him as forming a part of History of Philosophy.

Two essays, the one on Aristoteles, the other on Kant, are reprinted from the *Grande Encyclopédie*. They bear the mark of such works; they are destined to be read by the public in general, and they therefore contain only the absolutely necessary amount of philosophy; they are of no interest to the specialist.

The study on Boehme is entirely different. With the skill and clearness particular to French thinkers, Boutroux is most successful in extricating the rational element of the thought of Boehme, from the mystical form in which it is enveloped, and he succeeds in presenting a thorough and systematic statement of this philosophy, which is no easy matter. The author points out that the speculations of Boehme are very nearly the same as those of the later German metaphysicians—Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Baader, etc., although he presents them in a different form; and the former fact explains the name of *philosophus tentonicus*, which his friend Dr. Walther justly gives to Boehme. Upon reading Boutroux's work, one has the impression of encountering solid reasoning. And yet it seems to me that he is not entirely right. For not only does one meet with the speculations of Boehme in the works of German metaphysicians, as Boutroux says, but also with metaphysicians of all times and of all countries.

There are but few metaphysical interpretations of the world. They are generally ranged in three classes: pantheism, theism and materialism; and each kind of pantheism has only very few features differing from some other kind of pantheism, just as every kind of theism is akin to other theisms, and one materialism is akin to other materialisms.

Considered in this light, the argument of Boutroux loses a great deal of its value. The only outcome of his reasoning is, that, if the metaphysical speculations of Boehme seem more like those of German thinkers than of thinkers of other countries, it is because German thinkers are more apt than others to devote themselves to metaphysical speculations.

It often happens—and such seems to be the case here—that, in studying the works of a man, we gradually become fascinated by him and consider him more important than he really deserves. This is an error of which Boutroux became guilty, both in treating Boehme and in his examination of the influence of Scotch philosophers on French thought. It cannot be denied that this influence exists; Reid, Dugald Stewart, Brown were thinkers of the same stamp as

Royer, Collard, Cousin and Jouffroy. But, in reading Boutroux, one would have to believe that in the XIX century, very few, except the Scotch and Eclectic philosophers have had any influence. Boutroux preserves a most astonishing silence as to German, and especially Kantian, influence. It may be said that this does not pertain to his subject. Be it. But Boutroux has attributed so much in French philosophy to Scotch influence, that if he were now to write an essay upon German influence on French philosophy, he would find that he has left none to assign to the philosophers of that country. Not only does Boutroux completely ignore Kant, but he goes so far as to make Hamilton a pupil of Reid; and, what is worse than all else, he claims that Renouvier, the head of the New *Kantian* School in France, is a follower in philosophy of Hamilton.

Another striking example of the method of our author is this: According to Boutroux, A. Comte is a production of the Scotch School, *because* he considered Hume his most important precursor. How could a man like Boutroux apparently forget that the part of Hume's philosophy adopted by Comte, was exactly that part of his doctrine against which the School of Reid fought with might and main?

Finally, a few words on the essay on Socrates. It is the best thing ever written on this philosopher that I know of. The author discusses the opinions of prominent thinkers on Socrates, especially Schleiermacher, Zeller, Grote, Fonillée.

The most important theses attributed to Socrates by Boutroux are as follows: The object of his thinking is True Happiness in opposition to apparent bliss. He finds this happiness in virtue. The art of doing right has to combine itself with, or rather is based upon, the science of doing right. To attain this end, all science must be concentrated in ethics. Physics and metaphysics are treated by him only for the sake of ethics. Socrates's great merit consists in having established a science of ethics.

The basis of science—which our author considers synonymous with ethics—is the “General.” This word, we are to understand, means: What everybody thinks, what is the common fund of thinking of all men. There must exist something of this kind, since men can understand one another by means of language. In order to find out what this “General” is, one must speak with ordinary men, which, as we know, Socrates did. His method of teaching was the dialogue.

The result of his researches in the domain of science of ethics, is: Self-control is the greatest virtue. Socrates is not the good-natured man we often believe him to be; his actions seem to spring from a source of goodness, but his end was only his own perfection, not the relief of the suffering of others. His main object is to discipline himself.

See especially pages 83-84, too long to quote here.

ALBERT SCHINZ.

Scipio Sighele. Psychologie des Sectes. Traduction de L. BRANDIN. Paris, Girard & Brière, 1898. Bibliothèque de Sociologie Internationale.

Introduction. With the progress of civilization, crime has changed its character. With savage peoples it was gross and brutal; it has now grown more and more crafty and refined, it has become intellectual. This is not only the case with individual crime, but also with collective crime. The author claims the honor of having introduced the study of two kinds of crime in regard to collective bodies, such as crowds, sects, classes, etc.